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NEWMAN, MILLENNIALS, AND TEACHING COMPARATIVE 
THEOLOGY 
William L. Portier 
 
 
 On the face of it, John Henry Newman (1801-1890) and contemporary students of what is called 
the millennial generation make an incongruous combination.  Nevertheless, this essay enlists Newman to 
make the case that recent generational developments, often described as disaffiliation or post-
denominationalism, put comparative theologians in an epistemologically advantageous position to teach 
religion and theology to contemporary students.  Newman’s categories of “notional” and “real” 
apprehension and assent help to articulate how this might work in twenty-first-century classrooms. 
Each of the terms in this chapter’s title is fraught with ambivalence.  John Henry Newman was a 
member of the established intellectual elite of Victorian England and a citizen of the widest ranging 
colonial empire in the nineteenth-century world.  England had colonies and “possessions” on almost 
every continent.  Even in Newman’s lifetime, his younger contemporaries such as E.B. Tylor (1832-1917) 
and James George Frazer (1854-1941), based on their ethnocentric and often racist observations and 
speculations about people the British Empire had colonized, pioneered what would become the discipline 
of anthropology.  None of this was on Newman’s theological radar.  He had no interest in comparing his 
own Christian theology to the highly developed religious traditions of India, for example.  In addition, 
eighteenth-century intellectual norms of the English and Scottish Enlightenments, as represented by John 
Locke, David Hume, and Thomas Reid, dwelt creatively together in Newman’s capacious soul alongside 
such nineteenth-century norms as the Romantic recovery of history and religious particularity.  Nowhere 
is this clearer than in his distinction between the notional and the real.  Despite these ambiguities, I want 
to claim that Newman’s reflections, in terms of the real and notional distinction, on how disciplines work 
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and how they might be related, is helpful in thinking about how to practice comparative theology on a 
new demographic landscape. 
The demographic data that provides the basis for most contemporary reflection on the so-called 
“millennial” generation is also deeply ambivalent.  Statistical generalizations taken from survey data 
about young people can only be used with great care for the avoidance of stereotypes, and with attention 
to regional, institutional, gender, class, and other demographic variables.  Nevertheless, it seems 
undeniable that reflecting on such data and relating it to their own pedagogical situations will help 
professors in thinking about how their students learn, what students think is important, and how best to 
communicate a sense of the beauty and power of what Newman would call religious devotion in all its 
variety. 
As the essays in this volume will make clear, comparative theology shares in the ambivalence of 
the first two terms.  Practitioners debate questions about the stability and coherence of such terms as 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam and their adequacy to indicate what the discipline studies.  In its 
originating conception, comparative theology tended to be an engaged discipline whose practitioners 
began in their home tradition, passed over sympathetically to another, and came back home enriched.1  
Demographic data indicate that many professors of theology are likely to find themselves with a 
classroom of students who cannot be presumed to have home traditions.  Contemporary students are 
increasingly less likely to have serious knowledge of or commitment to any particular religious tradition 
from which they might pass over to another and return enriched to their home tradition.   
Mindful of these inconsistencies, but refusing to be paralyzed by them, this chapter proceeds in 
three parts.2  The first offers an exposition of Newman’s categories of “notional” and “real” and how he 
                                                          
1 This approach is illustrated in popularized form in Francis X. Clooney, S.J.  Hindu Wisdom for All God’s Children. 
Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998.  Clooney acknowledges the inadequacy of words such as Hinduism, but thinks 
they can be useful “as long as we also admit that the traditions we group under such labels are more rich and 
diverse than the ways in which we might fix them,” xii.  We might say the same of the term millennial. 
2 In thinking about these ambiguities and inconsistencies, I am reminded of Max Horkheimer’s “A Fable of 
Consistency” in which a tyrant who likes their work offers two poor poets a generous stipend.  Wishing to be in 
solidarity with the poor, the first poet refuses the stipend and eventually starves.  The second becomes the court 
poet.  From the general moral prescription of consistency, Horkheimer takes this lesson: “it is friendlier to tyrants 
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uses them to qualify what he calls “apprehension” and “assent.”  For present purposes, what Newman 
calls “real apprehension” emerges as the central concept.  Based on recent demographic data, the 
chapter’s second part offers a preliminary and necessarily limited statistical sketch of a twenty-first-
century classroom.  The third part asks how the discipline of comparative theology might adapt to such 
classrooms and, in the process, change and develop. Other contributors will discuss in depth such issues 
as the method, scope, and future of comparative theology.  In what follows, I urge only that Newman’s 
distinctions between “notional” and “real” apprehension might offer timely help to comparative 
theologians as they reflect on their discipline’s future.  
Newman 
From his early sermons through to his mature works, Newman’s intellectual approach is suffused, 
more or less explicitly, with some form of his distinction between “real” and “notional.”  Newman’s 
explicit explanation of this distinction appears in A Grammar of Assent (1870).  Before turning to that 
explanation, however, two examples from earlier works can illustrate how the “real” and “notional” 
distinction works for Newman.   
First, in this description of relations among history, philosophy, and poetry from Discourse VII of 
The Idea of A University (1858), distinctions and connections between what Newman means by “real” 
and “notional” are on full display.  “History, for example,” he begins with just a bit of elitist Victorian 
overconfidence, “shows things as they are, that is, the morals and interests of men [sic], disfigured and 
perverted by all their imperfections of passion, folly, and ambition.”  Philosophy and poetry add different 
perspectives, but none of the three are sufficient by themselves.  “Philosophy,” he continues, “strips the 
picture too much; poetry adorns it too much; the concentrated lights of the three correct the false peculiar 
colouring [sic] of each, and show us the truth.  The right mode of thinking upon it is to be had from taking 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
than to poor poets.”  For the fable, see Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, A History of the Frankfurt School 
and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), 36.  It was Horkheimer 
(1895-1973) who, in his 1937 essay “Traditional and Critical Theory” introduced the term “critical theory” into 
western philosophical discourse.  See Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory, Selected Essays, trans. Matthew J. 
O’Connell et al (New York: Continuum, 2002), 188-243. Though Horkheimer’s “Fable” doesn’t apply directly or in 
the same way to the three ambiguities above, it does suggest that in the world where we find ourselves nothing 
and no one is pure. 
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them all together ….” (Newman 1858, 176).  In this first case, philosophy would exemplify notional 
apprehension and assent.  With their focus on the particular, each in a different way, poetry and history 
exemplify real apprehension and assent. 
Newman’s An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (1845, revised 1878) offers a 
second example of how he is accustomed to deploy “real” and “notional.” This time he is dealing with 
questions about the historical self-identity of Christianity as a kind of living organism that inhabits a 
community of minds.  Before he begins, Newman considers the possibility that Christianity “is a mere 
name for a cluster or family of rival religions all together” (Newman 1878, 4).  When history is consulted 
to answer the question of what Christianity is, we encounter a host of variation.  To account for this 
difficulty, Newman proposes the hypothesis of his theory of development (Newman 1878, 20).   In order 
to distinguish what he calls true developments from mere corruptions of Christianity, Newman offers a 
series of seven criteria or “tests.”  In the 1878 edition, they become “notes.”  The essay also paints “three 
great church-historical tableaux,” (Nichols 1990, 51) dealing respectively with the first three centuries, 
the fourth-century Arian crisis, and the church of the fifth and sixth centuries.  Students of the Essay have 
debated whether its “center of gravity” (Nichols 51) is the notes or the three historical tableaux.   If we 
think of the notes as more “notional” and the historical sketches as more “real,” both appear central and 
the task of interpreting the Essay is clarified. 
In neither of these two examples does Newman explicitly mention “real” and “notional.”  An 
Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1870) turns explicitly to the distinction between “notional” and 
“real” and presents a primarily notional account of it.  If the Grammar’s account, in terms of what 
Newman calls “apprehension” and “assent” is more “notional,” we might see Newman’s earlier narrative 
of his own conversion in Apologia Pro Vita Sua (1864), autobiographical and thickly-textured 
historically, as more “real.”   
The Grammar of Assent – We turn now to Newman’s exposition in the Grammar of “The 
Apprehension of Propositions” (Chapter III) and “Apprehension and Assent in Matters of Religion” 
(Chapter V).  Newman is most interested in assent, a mental act of unconditional assertion.  Assent to a 
 5 
 
proposition, however, requires what he calls “apprehension” of its terms.  Apprehension is softer and 
more commodious than understanding.  Apprehension is “intelligent acceptance of an idea [notional 
apprehension] or a fact [real apprehension] enunciated by a proposition” (Newman 1870, 20).  If the 
subject of a proposition is a singular noun, apprehension of it is real.  If the subject of a proposition is a 
common or abstract noun, apprehension is notional.3  Singular nouns come from experience, common 
nouns from abstraction (Newman 1870, 23). Apprehension can be complex or both real and notional at 
once.   
“The heart,” Newman writes, “is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the 
imagination, by means of impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by description.  
Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us” (Newman 1870, 92-3).  That 
means real apprehension is, for Newman, “more vivid and forcible,” the stronger way of accepting a 
proposition, a way that often leads to action.  It “excites and stimulates affections and passions by 
bringing facts home as motive causes” (Newman 1870, 11).  Newman emphasizes the role of memory and 
imagination in both real and notional apprehension.  They account for variations in vividness (Newman 
1870, 23-31).  To regard someone as a human, he points out, is to make them a “logarithm of [their] true 
self.” 
Newman’s contrast of real and notional apprehension recalls his account, in The Idea of A 
University, of the relations among philosophy, history, and poetry, or the juxtaposition of the notes and 
historical tableaux in the Essay on Development.  In contrasting these two modes of thought, he observes: 
“[Y]et no one from the sight of a horse or a dog would be able to anticipate its zoological definition, nor 
from a knowledge of its definition to draw such a picture as would direct the eye to the living specimen.”  
He concludes: 
Each use of propositions has its own excellence and serviceableness and each has its own 
imperfection.  To apprehend notionally is to have breadth of mind, but to be shallow; to 
                                                          
3 If Newman’s use of the term proposition is off-putting, sentence or claim might be substituted.  He is thinking, 
whatever we choose to call it, of the basic unit linguistic animals use to describe the world and their own 
subjectivities, make claims about them, and construct arguments. 
 6 
 
apprehend really is to be deep, but to be narrow-minded.  The latter is the conservative principle 
of knowledge, and the former the principle of its advance.  Without the apprehension of notions, 
we would forever pace around one small circle of knowledge; without a firm hold on things, we 
shall waste ourselves in vague speculations.  However, real apprehension has the precedence, as 
being the scope and end and test of the notional; and the fuller the mind’s hold upon things or 
what it considers such, the more fertile is it in its aspects of them, and the more practical in its 
definitions (Newman 1870, 34). 
In Chapter V of the Grammar, Newman’s discussion of the apprehension of a religious tradition 
accommodates both texts (if they exist) as well as lived practice.  In the study of religions, real and 
notional translate into what Newman calls “devotion” and “theology.”  Based on these categories, a long 
discussion of how one might apprehend the Christian dogma of the Trinity makes up the entire second 
half of Chapter V.  Of the mystery of the Trinity, Newman asks: “is it capable of being apprehended 
otherwise than notionally? … Does it admit of being held in the imagination and embraced with a real 
assent?” (Newman 1870, 126-27). 
His answer distinguishes a creedal or confessional account of the doctrine in terms such as 
Father, Son, Spirit, three, and one, from a theological or dogmatic account using words such as 
substance, essence, form, subsistence, or circumincession.  While we might be able to apprehend and 
assent notionally to the dogmatic account, Newman thinks it impossible to give real assent to the mystery 
as a whole.  Real assent can only be given to the creedal propositions separately.  He then applies the 
distinction between theology and devotion to the Trinity and concludes: 
Religion has to do with the real and the real is particular; theology has to do with what is notional 
and the notional is the general and systematic.  Hence theology has to do with the Dogma of the 
Holy Trinity as a whole made up of many propositions; but religion has to do with each of those 
separate propositions that compose it and lives and thrives in contemplation of them.  In them it 
finds the motives for devotion and faithful obedience; while theology on the other hand forms and 
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protects them by virtue of its function of regarding them, not merely one by one, but as a system 
of truth (Newman 1870, 140). 
Though this description remains useful for my purposes in this chapter, its clarity and neatness 
conceal a certain tension between eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, between how Newman understands 
theology’s organizing role as notional or deductive and his insistence on the religious role of 
imagination.4 
Millennials 
The birth ranges chosen to define millennial can vary.  If we take the birth range of 1977-1995, 
this is a generation of 80 million people, about 22% of the U.S. population in 2013.  This is a lot of 
people.  Market researchers want to know how they’ll spend their money.  Political researchers want to 
know how or if they will vote.  Religious researchers are especially interested in what their impact on 
Christianity in the United States will be.  
Demographic research on millennials and religious “nones” has reached a saturation point. We 
have the General Social Survey, conducted since 1972 by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) 
at the University of Chicago, the Pew Forum, the Barna Group, Gallup, the Center for Applied Research 
in the Apostolate (CARA), Trinity College Center for Religion in Public Life, the Public Religion 
Research Institute/Berkley Center at Georgetown, and many more.  Generalizations abound.  “Self-
absorbed,” “entitled,” “attention addicts,” “they think they’re special,” “they want your job, but they don’t 
want to work for it” were some of the stereotypes mentioned in a Washington Post story about 
“Millennial Week” conceived and celebrated by millennials in Washington, D.C ., June 2-8, 2014 (June 4, 
2014, C 1-2). 
Students I have talked with are understandably uncomfortable with such generalizations.  In fact, 
they’re sick of hearing about them and want to define themselves.  Anyone who, for instructional or 
                                                          
4 Though space does not permit exploring these tensions in this chapter, David Hammond has investigated them in 
depth and with an eye toward their implications for theological method.   See David M. Hammond, “Imagination 
and Hermeneutical Theology: Newman’s Contribution to Theological Method” Downside Review 106 (1988): 17-34; 
“Affectivity, Imagination, and Intellect in Newman’s Apologia” Thought 67, no. 266 (September 1992): 271-86. 
 8 
 
religious purposes, draws upon the abundance of research on the millennial generation, must take care to 
keep in mind that these statistical generalizations conceal regional, local, and other demographic 
differences that will come into play among the particular populations such researchers are seeking to 
serve.  To paraphrase Newman, to call someone a millennial is to make them “a logarithm of [their] true 
self” (Newman 1870, 31). 
“The Rise of the Nones” - For those who teach theology in any of its forms, one of the most 
significant aspects of the vast research on the millennial generation has to do with what demographers 
refer to as religious “affiliation,” a person’s self-identification with a particular religious group.5  The 
2008 Pew Forum Religious Landscape Survey revealed considerable religious instability among the U.S. 
population and signaled that the United States was undergoing major religious shifts.6  Its relatively large 
sample of 35,000 Americans, as well as its use of interviews, adds to the significance of the 2008 survey.    
When demographers ask people about their religious affiliation, either in an interview or on a 
survey, there has been a dramatic increase among the “unaffiliated,” the number of people who answer 
“none.”  According to the 2008 Pew “Religious Landscape Survey,” 28% of Americans had left their 
“birth faith.”  If intra-Protestant shifts are included, the number rises to 44%.  Though the Protestant 
population has since dipped under 50%, in 2008, the United States, at a little over 50%, was still a 
predominantly Protestant country.  Former Catholics made up 10% of the U.S. population.  The fastest 
growing “religious” group in the United States in 2008 was the “unaffiliated” or “nones.”  
According to Gallup Daily tracking polls, with about 350,000 interviews annually, the rise of 
religious “nones” among the general population since 2008 was greatest between 2009 and 2010 and 
2010 and 2011.  Nones rose from 14.6% in 2008 to 17.8 in 2012.  Between 2011 and 2012, the rise seems 
to have slowed.  According to self-identifications in the general population, men (24%) are more likely to 
be nones than women (15%), Asians (27%) than non-Hispanic whites (18%), and Independents (22%) 
                                                          
5 See, for example, William L. Portier, “Here Come the Nones!  Pluralism and Evangelization after 
Denominationalism and Americanism” Horizons 40, no. 2 (December 2013): 275-92. 
6 For the full survey, see “U.S. Religious Landscape Survey,” http://religions.pewforum/pdf/report-religious-
landscape-study-full.pdf. 
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and Democrats (20%) than Republicans (8%).  Nones are most likely to be found in the New England, 
Pacific, and Mountain regions of the country.7 
According to “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” the Pew Forum’s 2015 update of the 
data upon which the 2008 survey was based, the nones or unaffiliated have continued to grow, and, in 
fact, are the largest growing group in the survey.  Between 2007 and 2014, the Christian share of the U.S. 
population declined from 78.4% to 70.6%.  34% of Americans now have a religious identity different 
from the one in which they were raised.  The 2014 data make clear that Christians across the board 
continue not reproducing themselves.  Between 2007 and 2014, the unaffiliated percent of the population 
increased from 16.1 to 22.8%.  From the perspective of a theology classroom, even more significant is the 
fact that this trend to “disaffiliation” is most pronounced among millennials.  34% of the millennial 
generation (ages 25-33) were unaffiliated in 2014, with the figure rising to 36% for college-age 
millennials (ages 18-24) [“America’s Changing Religious Landscape” 2015, 3-18].8 
Making sense of these numbers is more difficult than simply noting them.  Nones are 
significantly more likely to be agnostics and deists than atheists.  Their emergence seems to be related to 
larger shifts in American culture in general.  Explaining these shifts, however, is more a matter of 
speculative culture critique than demographic precision.  For example, Robert Putnam and David 
                                                          
7 See gallup.com/poll/159785/rise-religious-nones-slows-2012.aspx.  Despite the slight differences in percentages, 
attributable perhaps to differences in method, sample size, and relative margins of error, the surveys consulted 
seem to converge on the conclusion that since 2008 nones have increased dramatically, especially among the 
young.  See also Kosmin, Barry A. and Ariela Keysar with Ryan Cragun and Juhem Navarro-Rivera. 2009. “American 
Nones: The Profile of the No Religion Population.”  Program on Public Values, Trinity College.  Based on the 2008 
American Religious Identification  Survey of 54,461 adults, this study offers a comprehensive demographic profile 
of 2008 nones.  The geographical breakdown comes from this 2008 data.  “America’s Changing Religious 
Landscape,” the 2014 Pew Religious Landscape Survey (http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study), 
though it uses only four geographical regions instead of the nine used by 2008 American Religious Identification 
Survey, confirms the 2008 geographical trends.  The West, up from 21 to 28%, had the greatest concentration of 
nones, followed by the Northeast, up from 16 to 25% (p.  86).  Though she is in no way responsible for my use of 
them, I am grateful to Patricia Wittberg, SC for many of this chapter’s references to research on religious nones.  
8 The percentages in this paragraph are taken from the fifteen-page overview at the beginning of the 200-page 
“America’s Changing Religious Landscape.”  See also Hout, Michael; Claude S. Fischer and Mark A. Chaves. March 
2013. “More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Key Finding from the 2012 General Social Survey.”  UC 
Berkeley, Duke University.  In 2002 Hout and Fischer authored one of the first studies on the rise of religious non-
affiliation “Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations” American Sociological 
Review 67 (April 2002): 165-90. 
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Campbell relate such shifts to changes in American political culture, the shock of the long 1960s and two 
after-shocks.  They connect what they call the “rise of the nones” to a rejection of religion by the young 
because of its association after 1980 with social and political conservatism, itself a rejection of the 
cultural shifts of the 1960s, especially the “sexual revolution” (Putnam and Campbell 120, 121, 123).   
Putnam and Campbell cite an unnamed survey in which young Americans view religion as “judgmental, 
homophobic, hypocritical, and too political” (Putnam and Campbell 121). 
These words reappear in the 2012 Millennial Values Survey.  College age millennials, age 18-24, 
report that these words describe present-day Christianity somewhat or very well: “anti-gay” (64%); 
“judgmental” (62%); “hypocritical” or saying one thing, doing another (58%); “too involved in politics” 
(50%).  On the other hand, three quarters of college age millennials agree that present day Christianity 
“has good values and principles” and 63% agree that present day Christianity “consistently shows love for 
other people.”  These responses are further broken down into the percentages for “Christian” and 
“Religiously Unaffiliated” college age millennials.  As might be expected, the latter score lower on the 
positive assessments of present-day Christianity and higher on the negative descriptors.  The Christian 
(65%) and Religiously Unaffiliated (68%) millennials are almost unanimous in their agreement that 
present-day Christianity “teaches [the] same basic ideas as other religions” (Jones, Cox, Banchoff 31-32).   
This millennial ambivalence about present-day Christianity, even among self-identified 
Christians, seems to reflect what 2012 Gallup researchers (see note 7 above) interpret as a “general 
pattern of expression of religion in American society.”  According to this pattern, a trend toward “more 
unbranded, casual, informal religion,” one’s religiosity or spirituality need not find expression in a 
particular religious institution.  A recent Barna study breaks the “spiritually homeless” generation of 
millennial Christians into three vagabond groups.  They can be “nomads, claiming vestiges of their 
previous faith while mostly rejecting the church that fostered that faith; … prodigals, leaving Christianity 
in the rearview mirror; or …  exiles, struggling to connect their Christianity in a complex, accelerated 
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culture.”9  In a fragmented hyper-pluralism, this trend is not limited to churches and is probably part of a 
wider decline of belonging and general distrust of institutions such as banks, labor unions, political 
parties, and government.10   
Millennials appear to retain much of the idealism, optimism, and resilience often associated with 
the young, but they have less to do with churches and are more open to religious diversity than their 
predecessors.  Unbranded religiosity and lack of confidence in national institutions suggests smaller scale, 
local, more transparent forms of religious engagement with culture.  People who want to have a more 
immediate positive effect on society, as in volunteering, and tend to trust flat rather than hierarchical 
forms of organization, will be more inclined to seek God in family, friends and personal prayer rather 
than in churches.    
The twenty-first-century United States is no longer a Protestant majority society.  Already in the 
late twentieth century, Protestant thinkers as diverse as Stanley Hauerwas and Martin Marty recognized 
and strategized about how to respond to the passing of Protestant cultural hegemony after World War II.  
In After Christendom: How the Church is to Behave If Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation are Bad 
Ideas (1999), Hauerwas welcomed the “end of Christendom” which meant for him Christianity’s cultural 
captivity to America.  As a consolation, Marty introduced the idea of “public theologians” to provide for 
Christianity’s continuing public presence and influence in a society whose elites identified less and less 
with the Protestant mainline.  His examples of public theologians were Jonathan Edwards, Abraham 
Lincoln, and Reinhold Niebuhr.11 
Some hoped new Christian glue for a godly society might come from either the evangelical or 
immigrant Catholic sub-cultures, or from an alliance between them.  The brick and mortar immigrant 
Catholicism of the earlier twentieth century, however, has dissolved in demographic assimilation and 
                                                          
9 Barna Group. 2013.  “Three Spiritual Journeys of Millennials.” https://wwwbarna.org/barna-update/teens-
nextgen/612-three-spiritual-journeys-of-millennials. 
10 See John P. Hoffman, “Declining Religious Authority?  Confidence in the Leaders of Religious Organizations, 
1973-2010” Review of Religious Research 55, no 1 (2013): 1-25, esp. 20-23. 
11Martin Marty, “Two Kinds of Civil Religion,” in American Civil Religion, 139-57.  Edited by Russel E. Richey and 
Donald G. Jones.  New York: Harper and Row, 1974.  Amazingly, in 1974, Marty fails to include Martin Luther King, 
Jr. among his “public theologians.” 
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evangelicals struggle to retain and attract younger members.  The future is cloudy.  In another couple of 
generations, will new non-European Catholic immigrants and Latino/a evangelicals become sufficiently 
numerous and upwardly mobile to assume cultural positions analogous to those once held by immigrant 
Catholic and evangelical sub-cultures?  Or, will they simply be assimilated into the prevailing 
demography? The latter seems more likely.  
The twenty-first-century United States is post-denominational.  The denominationalism whose 
“social sources” H. Richard Niebuhr traced in The Social Sources of Denominationalism (1929) is quickly 
becoming a thing of the past.  Rather than culturally normative, the Christianity that remains in the United 
States is largely residual, regional, and personal.  In such a context, the Reformation and the American 
denominationalism that came later are largely unintelligible.  Anyone who doubts this should try teaching 
Reformation history or American religious history to contemporary students.  Denominational difference 
is increasingly irrelevant.  With conspicuous exceptions, most Christians tend to join churches, if they do, 
not because of theological convictions, but because they feel welcome or at home there. The voluntary, 
highly intentional and personal, live and let live Christianity that remains does not need denominations.  
If Christianity no longer provides cultural norms, we can hardly bemoan a loss of Christian religious 
literacy.  How can students such as those described above as “spiritually homeless” have a home tradition 
from which to learn and practice comparative theology as it was originally conceived?   
Twenty-First-Century Classrooms, Comparative Theology, and Real Apprehension 
Given the instability and diversity of our contemporary religious landscape and the fact that our 
demographic knowledge of millennials is based on statistical generalizations, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to describe a typical twenty-first-century classroom in the abstract.  Based on tremendous 
variations by institution and geographical region, we might imagine many such classrooms and the 
conditions that might account for their possible variations.   The following descriptions come with all 
these qualifications in mind. 
A twenty-first-century classroom has a good statistical chance of being more multi-racial.  
Compared to 72% of the general population, only 57% of college age millennials self-identify as white.  
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The rest are Hispanic (21%), black (14%), some other race (6%), with 3% claiming two or more racial 
categories (Jones, Cox, Banchoff, 2012, 1).  Obviously, this will vary by region and institution.  Students 
in urban schools in Los Angeles will probably be more diverse than students in a rural Iowa school. 
Students in a twenty-first-century classroom are “digital natives,” more likely to be digitally rather than 
print oriented.  They can fact check a class or a sermon.  A vast majority (about 89%) of college age 
millennials have Facebook accounts and 72% report using it at least once a day.  Interestingly, only 16% 
of college age millennials report tweeting daily (Jones, Cox, Banchoff, 11-12). Still, if you are a 
professor, it might be good to know that they can live tweet your class. 
As we have seen, both Christian millennials (65%) and those with no religious affiliation (68%) 
are almost unanimous in their agreement that present day Christianity teaches the same basic ideas as 
other religions.  This suggests that most students in an average millennial classroom are trending toward 
disaffiliation and not likely to have strong, normative religious commitments.  Barna reports that those 
who are not Christians express increasingly negative views of Christianity, with only 16 % of non-
Christian millennials reporting a “good impression” of Christianity.12  On the other hand, twenty-first-
century classrooms are likely to have small but significant numbers of Christians (10-20%), mostly 
evangelicals and Catholics, who have strong, normative Christian commitments.  According to the 2010 
General Social Survey, 16% of Catholics between 18 and 35 report weekly Mass attendance.  A 
comparable but higher number of evangelicals (20%) think going to church is important.    
Despite significant variations by region and institution, the cumulative impact of these numbers 
suggests that, from a variety of perspectives, contemporary class rooms are significantly less homogenous 
than in the past.  A twenty-first-century classroom is likely to be something of a religious soup in which 
strong home commitments mix with varying degrees of Christian residue and no religious commitments 
at all.  In the early 1990s, I recall meeting post-1989 Eastern European students for whom all religious 
discourse was baffling.  As universities internationalize, increasing numbers of students will have no 
                                                          
12 https://www.barna.org/barna-update/teens-nextgen/94-a-new-generation-expresses-its-skeptiscism-and- 
frustration-with-Christianity. 
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familiarity with western religious discourse.  Teaching in such classrooms will require a “multilingual,” 
hybrid approach that addresses, with different dialects and inflections, multiple audiences at the same 
time. 
Of course, it is impossible to predict in the abstract what might happen to comparative theology 
in such settings.   Although, as a Christian theologian, I taught an undergraduate course called “World 
Religions” for more than twenty years, I am not a comparative theologian in any strict sense.  I hesitate 
even to address this question.  Nevertheless, it is hard not to imagine that, just as it was back when I tried 
to convey to largely Christian students a vivid and rich sense of what various forms of Hinduism and 
Buddhism might be about, encouraging something like what Newman calls “real apprehension” – 
intelligent acceptance of a particular or particulars – will be involved in teaching comparative theology in 
this setting.  For that reason, I shall conclude with a few thoughts on what a comparative theologian might 
do in a twenty-first-century classroom. 
Christian theologians seem to have arrived at a leveled learning landscape on which, for the 
majority of students, learning about Christianity is the epistemological equivalent of learning about 
Hinduism or Islam.  This is probably more or less true for many other students, depending on the degree 
of residual Christianity they bring to the classroom.  In a general sense, Christianity in whatever form has 
been culturally de-privileged, even at church-related schools, and needs to be explained, much as various 
forms of Hinduism or Islam might be, in what Newman might call real terms.  If this is true, only a 
relatively small minority of students would, in principle, be capable of learning to practice comparative 
theology as it was originally conceived by scholars such as Francix X. Clooney and James Fredericks.    
More importantly, if contemporary students are anything like what surveys suggest, they tend to 
construct knowledge more in fragments and random combinations than architectonically or 
systematically, or, as Newman might say, notionally.  This situation calls for a primary emphasis on real 
apprehension in Newman’s sense rather than on more cognitive, systematic, primarily text-based 
approaches.  In Newman’s terms, students who have little familiarity with Buddhist devotion or practice 
can hardly be expected to approach it notionally or theologically.  In such a situation, an epistemological 
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advantage goes to a more appreciative, sympathetic approach that appeals to the imagination and the 
affections, rather than to a more impersonal, classificatory notional approach appealing primarily to our 
capacity for abstract reasoning.  Newman’s insistence that theology organizes, shapes, and guards 
individual claims of devotion by taking them together as “a system of truth” suggests that notional 
approaches cannot be completely abandoned. 
“Religion,” Newman writes, “has to do with the real and the real is particular.”  Real 
apprehension, then, is central to learning faith traditions as if from the inside, as forms of what Newman 
calls “devotion.”  “The heart,” he claims, “is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the 
imagination, by means of sense impression, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by 
description.  Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us” (Newman 1870, 
140, 92-3).  In comparative theology, this might suggest less emphasis on classic texts, institutional or 
religious brands and more on socially located, lived, religious practice.  It might mean emphasis on the 
thick description and local field work conducive to real apprehension, a sense of what it might feel like to 
be a Sivite in New Dehli or in dispersion, an Italian American Catholic in New York, a southern Baptist 
in Dallas, or a Shiite in a Baghdad controlled by Sunnis.  An emphasis on real apprehension allows 
students to reach for a sense as close as one can come to how these religious particulars might feel from 
the inside and a concomitant sense of religious difference. 
Perhaps the repressed eighteenth century and notional apprehension will one day return.  Study of 
pilgrimage, temples, and other devotional and meditative sites might eventually turn to close reading and 
reflection on classic texts.  In most contemporary settings, however, students will first have to engage in 
various forms of real apprehension of what Newman calls “religion” or “devotion.”  In large general 
education classes, this might prove particularly difficult and necessarily limited to pale reflections of what 
I’ve tried to describe above.   
As a cultural residue in many cases, a strong commitment in relatively few others, Christianity in 
its varied forms remains one among possible traditions to be studied in comparative theology, and, given 
our location in a largely post-Christian culture, perhaps emphasized, especially at church-related schools.  
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Whatever develops, perhaps everyone can agree on a basic Newmanian Student Learning Outcome 
something like this: Students will gain a real, not necessarily notional, apprehension of two or more 
religious families or traditions; neither real nor notional assent required. 
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